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The financial sector plays a key role in the functioning of a market economy.
This was dramatically illustrated by the Asian crisis since 1997. The finan-
cial services trade interests us as a subject of international trade and also for
its implications on the development of the financial sector.
This paper is about the liberalization of financial services trade in Korea.
Following this introduction, section 9.1 briefly reviews the benefits, costs,
and risks of the liberalization of financial services trade, as they appear in
the literature, and section 9.2 discusses what it takes to realize the benefits
of trade in developing countries. Section 9.3 describes Korea’s liberaliza-
tion measures in financial services trade before and after the financial cri-
sis. Section 9.4 discusses the trends in financial services trade in Korea and
tries to see what benefits there were from the limited liberalization before
the crisis, and section 9.5 concludes the paper.
Among various financial services, the main focus of the paper is on
banking services, because banks occupy the central position in Korea’s fi-
nancial sector. Also, two main topics of discussion are two modes of ser-
vice trade, namely, cross-border and commercial presence, because the
other two modes, namely, consumption abroad and the presence of natu-
ral persons, are of relatively little importance in the financial services
trade.1
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1. Mattoo (1999) reports that the financial service trade through commercial presence was
two times or more as large as the cross-border trade, whereas the other two modes were in-
significant in the case of the United States, the only country that reports trade through com-
mercial presence on a regular basis.
9.1 Benefits and Costs of Liberalization of Financial Services Trade
Banks and other financial service providers oﬀer many diﬀerent services,
such as accepting deposits, lending, underwriting, brokering, and so on, at
various rates and fees. In doing so they perform five basic functions, ac-
cording to Levine (1996): facilitating the exchange of goods and services;
facilitating risk management; mobilizing resources; obtaining information,
evaluating firms, and allocating capital; and providing corporate control.
Obviously, these are critical functions for a market economy, and the exter-
nalities involved in the provision of financial services are substantial.
9.1.1 Benefits of Liberalization
Liberalization of financial services trade is supposed to provide certain
benefits. Better financial services in terms of cost and variety will be oﬀered
to domestic customers across the border and by foreign banks that enter the
domestic market. Also, as competition intensifies, the domestic banks will
be forced to improve the quality and variety of the services while lowering
the costs. Consequently, consumers’ welfare will increase, and resources
previously employed in the financial sector may shift to more productive
employment in other sectors, increasing the economy’s output under the
international price regime. These benefits closely correspond to the gains
from trade in the simple model of international goods trade and will be
called in this paper the direct benefits.
Liberalization of financial services trade seems to be advocated as much
for indirect benefits as for direct ones. The indirect benefits refer to systemic
improvements of the financial sector. They include improvements in the ba-
sic functions embodied in the banks’ services, especially assessment of bor-
rowers’ creditworthiness, risk management, and corporate control. In ad-
dition, foreign banks are expected to raise the financial sector’s standards
by which accounts or financial statements are prepared and assets valued,
as they follow the home country regulations or international standards
(Glaessner and Oks, 1998). The information available about borrowers and,
through competition, about financial services providers themselves would
also increase in quantity and quality, leading to an improvement of the ba-
sic functions.
Also, liberalization of financial services trade can provide an impetus to
an improvement in legal and regulatory infrastructure. As financial services
trade opens between a developed and a developing country, the banks in
both countries would seek to export their services in order to follow and
serve their clients. This provides an occasion for the developed country to
demand that the developing country’s financial regulations and supervision
be adequate. The same demand may also come from developing countries’
banks, as they seek access to the developed countries’ markets. Laws and
regulations that have direct bearing on the operations of financial institu-
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tions, such as corporate and bankruptcy law, laws regarding negotiable in-
struments, and the like, may also improve (Levine 1996).
9.1.2 Costs and Risks of Liberalization
Various arguments have been advanced against liberalization of financial
services trade. Because few barriers are left in Korea at this moment, as will
be explained in section 9.3, some are of little relevance. Examples include
the infant industry argument and the argument that too rapid a liberaliza-
tion could lead to financial distress among domestic financial firms as their
profits decline. More relevant would be the argument based on the govern-
ment’s limited ability to properly supervise and monitor a more complex fi-
nancial system. When combined with the lack of credibility in enforcing
prudential regulations and withdrawing (implicit) insurance schemes, the
limited ability could encourage banks to take excessive risks at the final ex-
pense of the government (Claessens and Glaessner, 1998). This is a risk war-
ranted by the potential for improvements in regulatory infrastructure and
strengthening of the government’s supervisory capacity.
Other arguments against liberalization seem to be on shaky ground or
do not seem strong enough to justify keeping the financial market closed
(Musalem, Vittas, and Demirgüç-Kunt 1993). One argument alleges that
foreign financial institutions facilitate capital flight out of the host country.
However, domestic institutions could play the same role. Another fear is
that foreign institutions may drive the local ones out of business and dom-
inate the host country’s financial sector. Although this cannot be dismissed
as an impossibility, a near or complete domination seems extremely rare.
According to Gelb and Sagari (1990), as reported in Levine (1996), foreign
banks’ median share of total domestic assets in a sample of twenty coun-
tries was about 6 percent. A related argument questions the foreign firms’
commitment to local markets, worrying about the possibility that they
would retreat from the host country in response to diﬃculties at home or in
the local market. Still another argument anticipates diﬃculty in conducting
monetary policy when the presence of foreign institutions is substantial in
the financial sector. Claessens and Glaessner (1998) report that in New
Zealand, where the financial system is largely in the hands of foreigners,
monetary policy is not adversely aﬀected, nor is there evidence of little com-
mitment to the local market.
9.2 Realization of the Benefits
This section discusses what it takes for liberalization to succeed in realiz-
ing the benefits. The direct benefits are expected to be realized with little
diﬃculty, as in the goods trade, where the gains from trade arise as the
goods are delivered across the border. This would be the case for modes of
both cross-border trade and commercial presence.
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However, it would not be as easy to obtain the indirect benefits, an im-
provement of the financial system itself. The reason becomes clear when
one recalls the nature of finance. White (1999) says that everywhere finance
involves a time-sequencing problem: “Finance always involves an initial
conveyance of funds—a loan, an investment—and then a later reversal of
the flow of funds—the loan repayment (plus interest), a stream of divi-
dends, etc.” (3; author’s emphasis).2 Even before making a loan, the lender
needs to know about the risks and prospects of repayment and, after mak-
ing the loan, about the borrower’s behavior and performance. Information
asymmetry exists, however, because the borrower naturally has more infor-
mation about him- or herself and his or her own work than the lender. If
non-repayment is not sanctioned, a moral hazard problem is likely to arise,
because the borrower will receive the “upside” benefits from a risky under-
taking while not bearing the “downside” costs.
Given these circumstances, financial intermediation evidently requires
the basic functions such as information gathering, credit assessment and
risk management, and performance monitoring and corporate control. It
seems, however, that development of these functions is lacking in many de-
veloping countries, including Korea, as the latest Asian financial crises re-
vealed. The lack of development appears to have much to do with the “rules
of the game” of a given society. As in North (1990), a society’s rules of the
game (ROGs) refer to the totality of its formal and informal institutions
such as the legal system, government regulations, social customs, and prac-
tices. As such, the ROGs refer to the way the written laws and regulations
are applied and enforced as well as the laws and regulations themselves.3 For
our discussion of financial services, one important example of the ROGs
would be how the decision is actually made regarding who among many ap-
plicants gets the bank loans, and another, what kind of penalty the bor-
rower gets when he or she is unable to pay back the loans.
In Korea and some other Asian countries the government extensively
and intensively intervened in the workings of the market through formulat-
ing and executing development plans, industrial and trade policies, and so-
called administrative guidance. In the process, the banks often became the
financing instruments of development plans and industrial policies. The
government directly or indirectly exercised influence on loan-making de-
cisions. Under the circumstances, the prospects of repayment or perfor-
mance may not have been a primary concern to the banks. Also, such gov-
ernment involvement usually carried with it an implicit insurance against
losses. In this case, banks had little incentive to develop capacities to per-
form the basic functions. Moreover, banks themselves were prone to moral
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2. The rest of this paragraph also draws on White 1999.
3. Elsewhere, one of the authors provides a fuller discussion of the rules of the game and the
importance in Korean context (Yoo 1998).
hazard, behavior because the owners and managers bore limited responsi-
bilities.
By contrast, development of these capacities will be indispensable if the
society’s ROGs are fair and transparent.4 In this case, borrowers will have
equal opportunities to obtain a loan and banks to make loans to prospec-
tive borrowers, and it will matter how much profit a bank makes. A lending
decision will be evaluated and rewarded in an unbiased manner, mainly on
the basis of its consequences on profits, both internally within a bank and
externally in the financial market. The banks will do their best in gathering
and processing relevant information and in examining the prospect of be-
ing repaid the principal and interest. This way, high-quality basic financial
functions will be embodied in the services they provide.
Hence, how well developed the basic functions of financial intermedia-
tion are in a society would critically depend on the fairness and trans-
parency of its ROGs. The existence of factors of production such as skilled
manpower and capital would not be suﬃcient. In addition, the ROGs in the
financial sector should be fair and transparent enough so that high inter-
national standards of asset valuation and transparency may be put into
practice and eﬀective competition reign in the financial market.
Thus, the realization of indirect benefits of financial services trade will
depend on the availability of two diﬀerent kinds of factors. One may be
called internal factors—factors that render services to production by being
employed within the firms producing the services in question. Skilled man-
power and capital are typical examples. The other may be called external
factors, as these render services to production that exist outside firms. In the
above discussion such a factor is the society’s ROGs. Either one of the two
kinds of factors may work as a constraint on the realization of the benefits.
Of these two potential constraints, lack or shortage of the internal factors
may present less diﬃculty, because this can be overcome relatively easily at
the firm level by training or even by importing from abroad the factors in
short supply. However, if unfair and nontransparent ROGs are the binding
constraint, the indirect benefits from financial services trade may not be
easily realized: What is required is a change in the way the financial market,
if not the whole society, operates, although the presence of foreign financial
firms may provide an impetus for such a change.
9.3 Liberalization of Financial Services Trade in Korea
The need for financial deregulation and reform has long been recognized,
but financial deregulation in Korea has been very cautious and slow, as
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4. The ROGs are fair when every economic agent enjoys an equal opportunity ex ante and
its ability, eﬀorts, and performances are evaluated by the same standard, and when one is held
accountable for one’s own actions ex post. They are transparent when the rules themselves are
known to all economic agents or when a way of knowing them is open to them.
Kang (2000) reports. Only as recently as early 1997, the same year the coun-
try was hit by currency and financial crises, the government established the
Presidential Commission for Financial Reform.5 The economic crisis
brought about fundamental changes to Korea’s economic policies. Regard-
ing the policy on financial services trade, the crisis stands as a defining mo-
ment. It revolutionized the policy stance from lukewarm and partial open-
ing to swift and full opening. This section begins with a brief review of the
exchange rate policy, and the remainder describes the liberalization of fi-
nancial services trade, distinguishing the precrisis from the postcrisis pe-
riod.
9.3.1 Foreign Exchange Rate Policy6
Korea’s exchange rate policy changed from a nominal anchor approach
in the 1970s to a real target approach with the introduction of Multiple Cur-
rency Basket Peg System in February 1980. In the wake of the realignment
of major currencies in the mid-1980s, Korea’s current account showed large
surpluses, and the international financial institutions and the U.S. Treasury
accused the Korean government of manipulating its exchange rate. This led
to an adoption of Market Average Exchange Rate System in March 1990,
under which the won-dollar exchange rate was determined in the market
within a band that was initially set at 0.4 percent above and below the rate
of the previous day. The band was gradually widened over time and was
eliminated in December 1997, immediately after the currency crisis. Since
then, the policy maintained a floating exchange rate system and limited gov-
ernment intervention in the exchange market to smoothing volatility.
9.3.2 Before the Crisis
Cross-Border Trade
Before the crisis, the policy on cross-border trade was not made on its
own merit but was decided as a by-product of capital account liberalization
policy. Specifically, for the banking sector, cross-border trade was not al-
lowed (and still is not) under the banking law, since the law followed posi-
tive system and had no provisions regarding cross-border trade. In conse-
quence, only limited cross-border trade was allowed under the Foreign
Exchange Management Act as a part of permitted capital transactions.
With respect to capital account liberalization, the policy stance was dic-
tated by the concern about the current account balance. Hence, during the
1990s, when the current account recorded large deficits, the Korean gov-
ernment was reluctant to take any policy measures that would ease capital
outflows.
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5. See Kang (2000) for the discussion of financial deregulation before the crisis.
6. This subsection draws on Park (1996).
This policy stance was maintained with regard to the cross-border trade.
Liberalization began with those transactions that would lead to capital in-
flows, although the extent of liberalization was diﬀerent depending on
mode of transactions. Although cross-border trade by individuals was left
closed, certain transactions were allowed for corporations as a part of cap-
ital account liberalization. Thus, overseas bond issuance by financial insti-
tutions and corporations was deregulated in 1991, subject to discretionary
quantity control by the government. Also, foreign borrowings by corpora-
tions were allowed in 1995, again with attached restrictions on the use of
funds and government approval required. Liberalization of trade-related
short-term financing was made relatively free, with fewer restrictions at-
tached: regulations on deferred import payments and receipt of advance
payments for exports were lifted step by step, with few restrictions through-
out the 1990s.
Relative to individuals and corporations, banks were given more freedom
in transactions with foreign agents, although the allowed transactions were
limited to overseas bond issuing and foreign borrowings. For banks, there
were no formal restrictions on foreign borrowings, although it is known
that the government imposed informal quantity controls. However, accord-
ing to practitioners, the restrictions were lifted in 1994.
Commercial Presence
In the early 1990s when the current account was still in chronic deficit, the
government allowed a number of foreign banks to enter the Korean market
in order to help attract foreign capital. The government removed the upper
ceilings on foreign bank capital in 1991. The five-year financial liberaliza-
tion plan announced in 1993 aimed mainly at interest rate deregulation and
abolition of the limits on maximum maturity for loans and deposits of
banks, among other goals. As a part of the liberalization, the scope of fi-
nancial activities allowed for foreign banks was broadened to include local
branch establishment.
Foreign security companies were authorized to do business in 1992, when
the Korean stock market was opened partially. Again, however, they were
permitted to open only branches.
Regarding commercial presence, a potentially important development
occurred in 1996 on Korea’s accession to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). In order to fulfill its obligations
as a member of the organization, the Korean government announced in
September a blueprint that gradually would remove barriers to foreign
portfolio investment and allow foreign direct investment. The following
summarizes the 1996 commitments:
• Foreign banks and securities firms from OECD countries would be
permitted to establish subsidiaries in South Korea by 1998.
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• Aggregate foreign investment ceilings for investors from OECD coun-
tries were to be phased out by 2000.
• Foreign investors from OECD countries would be allowed to establish
and hold 100 percent ownership of any type of financial institution by
December 1998.
• Foreign investment consulting firms from OECD countries would be
able to oﬀer their services without establishing a commercial presence
in Korea.
9.3.3 After the Crisis
Since the economic crisis in 1997, the Korean government has started a
sweeping reform of the financial sector. We first take a look at the deregu-
lation of the financial market that allows international transactions of
stocks, bonds, and other instruments and then discuss the liberalization of
the two modes of financial services trade.
Deregulation of the Financial Market
Domestic Stock and Bond Market. In order to promote inflows of foreign
capital, Korea opened the domestic stock and bond and money markets.
Ceilings on foreigners’ equity investments were completely lifted in May
1998 with the exception of investment in state-owned enterprises, as indi-
cated in table 9.1. Also, the requirement was eliminated that domestic sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies should obtain government approval when in-
troducing more than $1 million from abroad.
The corporate bond and government bond markets were completely
opened to foreigners at the end of 1997, as shown in table 9.2. The foreign
investment on the bond of non-listed companies was allowed in July 1998.7
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Table 9.1 Trend in the Expansion of Limits on Equity Investment by Foreigners,
1992–98 (%)
Date Non–State-Owned Companies State-Owned Companies
January 1992 10 8
December 1994 12 8
July 1995 15 10
April 1996 18 12
October 1996 20 15
May 1997 23 18
November 1997 26 21
December 1997 55 25
May 1998 100 30
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Press Release, January 2000.
7. A more detailed table on bond market liberalization is provided in appendix table 9A.1.
The opening of the money market, such as the markets for commercial pa-
pers (CP) and certificates of deposit (CD), proceeded in steps and was com-
pleted in May 1998.
Foreign Exchange Market. As of July 1998, the government liberalized
medium-term foreign borrowing in order to help the firms attract foreign
capital. In addition, the restrictions on the types of goods and duration of
credit were also relaxed for import and export credits.
In April 1999, the government abolished the restrictive Foreign Exchange
Management Act and replaced it with Foreign Exchange Transaction Act.
The regulation for capital account transactions was changed from a posi-
tive system to a negative system. As a result, the following capital transac-
tions were allowed:
• Oﬀshore issuance of securities and foreign borrowing with a maturity
of less than one year
• Oﬀshore investment in foreign financial markets, foreign insurance
markets, and foreign real estate markets by domestic firms and finan-
cial institutions
• Establishment of domestic saving deposits (including trust deposits) by
nonresidents with a maturity in excess of one year
• Issuance of won-denominated (maturity exceeding one year) and for-
eign currency–denominated securities by nonresidents, and transac-
tions of derivatives through domestic financial institutions
From the year 2001, foreign exchange transactions by individuals, such
as won-based domestic deposits by nonresidents of maturity less than one
year, will be liberalized. The government will also allow individuals to freely
deposit their money in banks abroad and buy foreign securities or foreign
real estate. At this point, the level of liberalization in Korea will be close to
that of the OECD countries.
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Table 9.2 Opening of the Bond and Money Markets, 1994–98
Date Instruments
July 1994 Non-guaranteed convertible bonds issued by small and mid-size
companies
June 1997 Non-guaranteed convertible bonds issued by large companies, and non-
guaranteed bonds issued by small and mid-size companies
December 1997 Corporate bond and government bond
February 1998 CPs and trade-bill
May 1998 All money market instruments including CDs and Repos
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Press Release, May 1998; Financial Supervisory
Service, Press Release, January 2000.
Cross-Border Trade
Despite the sweeping reform and deregulation of the financial sector
since the economic crisis, the cross-border trade in the banking sector is
only partially opened under the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act, be-
cause the banking law, which adheres to the positive system, does not deal
with cross-border trade. Also, the cross-border trade in securities is not al-
lowed because the security law allows trading only through commercial
presence. However, the investment trust companies (ITC) are allowed to
trade mutual funds without commercial presence (see table 9.3).
Commercial Presence
Important steps were taken in the spring of 1998 to increase foreigners’
access to the Korean financial market. Foreign banks and securities firms
were authorized to establish subsidiaries in March. In addition, 100 percent
foreign ownership of Korean institutions was allowed in April, and foreign
nationals were allowed to become directors of Korean banks in May.
Banks.8 The branch of a foreign bank is treated as an independent financial
institution, and its operations are similar to those of subsidiaries of foreign
banks, including retail businesses. There are no restrictions on establishing
subsidiaries for foreign banks in Korea. Establishment of a new commer-
cial bank, whether domestic or foreign-owned, requires the permission of
only the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). The minimum capital
required is 100 billion won for establishing a nationwide commercial bank
and 25 billion won for a regional bank. In addition, foreign banks in Korea
have been able to have local branches in the domestic market since March
1998. The foreign exchange position is regulated for prudential reasons.
The maximum oversold position allowed of spot foreign exchange is US$5
million or 3 percent of capital, whichever is greater.
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Table 9.3 The Status of Liberalization in 2000
Investment Investment Life Non-Life
Bank Security Trust Company Advisory Insurance Insurance
Branch establishment Open Open Open Open Open Open
Subsidiary 
establishment Open Open Open Open Open Open
Joint venture Open Open Open Open Not open Not open
Cross-border trade Partially Not open Partially open Open Open Aviation, 
open hull (open)
Source: Korea Institute of Finance (2000).
8. A table on Korea’s World Trade Organization commitment is available from the authors
upon request.
For the ownership of banks, the prior limits of 4 percent in a nationwide
bank, 8 percent in a bank converted from a nonbank financial institution,
and 15 percent in a regional bank were mitigated by allowing the acquisi-
tion of shares in excess of those limits with approval from, or prior notice
to, the FSC. Foreign ownership of up to 100 percent was permitted from
April 1999, although it is subject to additional review by the FSC in line
with the increase in stakes beyond certain predetermined thresholds. Also,
laws were enacted to strengthen the powers of banks’ boards of directors
and to enhance transparency in dealings with shareholders. Foreigners
have been permitted to become directors of bank boards since May 1998.
Therefore, any foreign bank meeting the conditions, which are applied
equally to domestic banks, is allowed to enter the market.9
There were sixty one branches of foreign banks and twenty six foreign
representative oﬃces as of the end of December 1999. The Korea First
Bank was sold in September 1999 to New Bridge Capital in the United
States, and there are foreigners participating in management in Housing
& Commercial Bank, HanMi Bank, and Foreign Exchange Bank (see
table 9.4).
Nonbank Financial Institutions. In the case of security companies, the for-
eign investment mostly took the form of opening new branches or oﬃces
before the crisis. After the crisis, the foreign investments took the form of
acquisition of existing firms or share participation. As of the end of 1999,
there were twenty branches of foreign securities companies and seven rep-
resentative oﬃces in Korea (see table 9.5).
With the removal of entry barriers to the security industry, the eﬀorts to
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Table 9.4 Foreign Shares of Domestic Banks as of the end of 1999 (%)
Banks Government Share Main Foreign Investor
Cho Hung 80.05 —
Hanvit 74.65 —
Korea First 49.00 New Bridge (51%)
Seoul 95.68 —
Korea Exchange 35.92 Commerz Bank (23.6%)
Kookmin 6.48 Goldman Sachs (18%)
Korea Housing and Commercial 14.50 ING Group (10%)
Shinhan — Korean-Japanese (49.43%)a
KorAm — BOA (16.8%)
Hana — IFC (3.3%)
Peace — —
Source: Data supplied by Financial Supervisory Service.
aThis figure is as of April 12, 2000.
9. See appendix table 9A.2 for a greater, detailed explanation of liberalization measures.
bring in foreign investments led to an increase in capital participation and
management participation by foreigners, as shown in table 9.6. In addition,
in April 1998, due to the liberalization of security firm establishment, for-
eign firms’ merge with and acquisition of domestic security firms became
possible.
9.4 Trends and Gains in Financial Services Trade in the 1990s
9.4.1 Trends in Financial Services Trade
Cross-Border Trade: Capital Flow
Policy Stance. As discussed in the previous section, the government pursued
financial liberalization throughout the 1990s while varying the speed of lib-
eralization according to concerned economic agents. It seems that the in-
tent was to allow more freedom for banks than for other agents, such as
nonfinancial corporations and individuals. Apparently the government
preferred gradual liberalization as a way of controlling associated risks and,
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Table 9.5 The Trends of Foreign Security Company’s Branch, 1991–2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Establishment 2 5 2 2 4 5 3 2 2 0 27
Closure 1 3 1 2 7
Total 2 7 9 11 14 19 22 21 22 20 20
Source: Data supplied by Financial Supervisory Service.
Table 9.6 Foreign Participation in Security Firms as of March 2000 (%)
Security Company Main Foreign Investors Share
Seoul QE International (L) Ltd. 21.28
S.A.C. Capital International Ltd. 3.97
SR Investment (L) Ltd. 4.29
SR Global International Fund LP 0.44
Asian Capital Holdings Fund S/A Berceuse Investment N.V 0.10
Good-Morning Asia Pacific Growth Fund II 16.7
KGRF 3.6
Lombard Korea Ltd. 6.8
Government of Singapore Investment Corp. 5.9
Daeyu Regent Regent Pacific Group Ltd. 42.68
KEB Smith Barney Saloman Brothers Holding Co., Inc. 80.00
Hannuri Saloman Smith Barney Inc. 25.00
Saloman Brothers Holding Co., Inc. 24.00
KGI Cho Hung KGI Korea Ltd. 51.00
Meritz Trader investment 30.82
Source: Data supplied by Financial Supervisory Service.
in particular, appeared to have an intention of utilizing banks as a risk man-
ager. Presumably, the underlying assumption was that banks would make
cautious brokers in linking foreign suppliers of financial services with do-
mestic consumers, which was proved to be a gross error by the 1997 crisis.
Characteristics. As a result of the government’ strategy, the capital flows in
and out of Korea during the period took place mainly through the banks.
The Korean economy experienced substantial net capital inflows from 1990
through the 1997 crisis. The magnitude of inflows remained small in the first
four years, at 1.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on average, but
for the three years from 1994 to 1996 more than doubled to 3.5 percent of
GDP (see figure 9.1). Stock investment by foreigners explains only the lim-
ited portion of the increase, owing to the quantity restrictions imposed.
Thus, debt contracts and debt portfolios were the major carriers of capital
inflows, and in consequence the surge in net capital inflows was tantamount
to a sharp increase in Korea’s external debt.
The Korean financial sector was the major issuer of the debt contracts
and portfolios. Of the total increase in external debt during 1994–96, the fi-
nancial sector explains about 70 percent (see table 9.7). As a matter of fact,
the amount of resources provided to the Korean banks by foreign creditors
was much larger than represented by external debts, as the Korean banks
were allowed to open and expand operations of overseas branches as a part
of liberalization measures. The resulting increase in borrowings of the over-
seas branches from foreign banks was as large as the rise in external debts
of the Korean banks (see table 9.8).
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Fig. 9.1 Trend and composition of net capital inflows to Korea
Source: Bank of Korea online service.
As is well known, creditors to the Korean banks were foreign banks.
Hence, we can sum up that the cross-border financial services trade of Ko-
rea for the 1990s had been mainly between Korean banks and foreign
banks. Transactions involving final consumers remained limited.
Commercial Presence
Policy Stance. Throughout the 1990s the Korean government continued to
be reluctant to allow wider commercial presence of foreign financial insti-
tutions, as discussed in the previous section. As a result, the only form of en-
try into the Korean financial market permitted to foreign banks was the
opening of branches.
It was noted earlier that the Korean government preferred banks’ acting
as risk manager in allowing more inflow of foreign capital and in its alloca-
tion. The conservative policy stance toward commercial presence may be
explained by the same preference. The rationale must have been that, for the
banks to fulfill the job properly intended for them, they needed to be pro-
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Table 9.7 External Debt of Korea, by Sector: 1992–97 (US$100 millions)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public sector 56 38 36 30 24 223
Long-term 56 38 36 30 24 223
Short-term 0 0 0 0 0 0
Corporate sector 137 156 200 261 356 462
Long-term 65 78 90 105 136 253
Short-term 72 78 110 156 220 209
Financial sector 235 244 333 493 667 584
Long-term 122 130 139 196 277 310
Short-term 113 114 194 297 390 274
Total 428 439 568 784 1,047 1,268
Long-term 243 247 265 331 437 786
Short-term 185 192 304 453 610 482
Total/GNP (%) 14 13.3 15.1 17.3 21.8 28.6
Source: Bank of Korea, Annual Foreign Exchange Statistics (various issues); Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economy, Press Release, June 8, 1999.
Table 9.8 Foreign Currency Liabilities of Overseas Branches of Korean Banks,
1992–97 (US$100 millions)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Domestic branches 157 163 226 363 507 387.9
Foreign branches 201 231 317 413 529 312.5
Sum 358 394 543 776 1,036 700.4
Sum/GNP (%) 13.8 9.9 12.3 16.0 22.2 24.6
Sources: Bank of Korea, Annual Foreign Exchange Statistics (various issues); Korea Develop-
ment Institute, Major Indicators of the Korean Economy (various issues).
tected from too much protection, which might hamper their soundness.
Thus, commercial presence of foreign banks could not be encouraged.
In addition, the policy stance seems to have been strongly influenced by
a development in the domestic market that adversely aﬀected the banking
sector. Since the 1970s, the Korean government promoted the development
of securities markets. Naturally it led to the rapid growth of such players as
investment trust companies and merchant banking corporations.10 That the
Korean banks were already facing tough competition from non-banking fi-
nancial institutions deterred any policy initiatives that might further in-
crease hardship for the Korean banks.
Characteristics. Given the policy stance, the opening of branches of foreign
banks in the 1990s was sluggish, to say the least. The number of branches in
operation actually declined. In addition, their market share compared to
the Korean banks shrank (table 9.9, figure 9.2).
Not only their overall growth but also their scope of business was con-
fined. Among sources of funds for the foreign banks, interoﬃce borrowing
dominated, accounting for over 70 percent of their liabilities. The rest of li-
abilities were in the form of oﬀshore borrowing (figure 9.3). Reflecting the
liability side, foreign currency–denominated lending was the major compo-
nent of their assets. In particular, the Korean banks were the main borrow-
ers (figure 9.4).
In sum, until the financial crisis, the financial services trade through com-
mercial presence was not much diﬀerent from cross-border trade. It was only
facilitating capital inflows into the Korean economy rather than allowing
foreign intermediaries to participate fully in the Korean financial market.
9.4.2 Gains from Trade?
The experience with financial services trade in Korea during most of the
1990s was limited in both the scope of trade liberalization and the length of
time. This subsection first tries to see if direct benefits of better financial ser-
vices were provided and then discusses whether there were any direct bene-
fits of systemic improvement in the financial sector.
Direct Benefits
Liberalization of financial services trade is supposed to provide better fi-
nancial services in terms of cost and variety and increased output through
resource reallocation. We observe the trend in interest rate margin between
banks’ lending and borrowing rates, because it is relatively straightforward
compared to measuring the improvement in variety or estimating the in-
crease in the nation’s output.
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10. Dooley and Shin (2000) argue that the Korean banks were losing their charter values ow-
ing to the competition.
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The interest margins appear to decline in the 1990s (see table 9.10). When
computed by subtracting deposit rate from lending rate, the average over
the five years from 1992 to 1996 was 2.60, representing a 27 percent decline
from the average margin over the preceding five years of 3.58. Moreover,
this may underestimate the actual drop, because the interest rates were un-
Korea’s Liberalization of Financial Services Trade 299
Fig. 9.2 Growth in assets of the Korean branches of foreign banks (in comparison
to Korean banks)
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Bank Management Statistics (various issues).
Fig. 9.3 Liability composition of the Korean branches of foreign banks
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Bank Management Statistics (various issues).
der the influence of the government. It should be noted that, despite inter-
est rates’ deregulation in the 1990s, banks were not given full freedom to ad-
just the lending rates. Through moral suasion, the policy makers eﬀectively
depressed banks’ “oﬃcial” lending rates as well as deposit rates. As is well
known, banks got around this informal control when providing loans by de-
manding that borrowers deposit some portion of the loans at low interest
rates. If the corporate bond rates are used as proxy for the bank lending
rates in computing the margins, the magnitude of decline exceeds 40 per-
cent. The cost of capital, when based on corporate bond rates, was clearly
declining as well. 
However, it does not seem appropriate to attribute these developments to
liberalization of the financial services trade alone. Liberalization of domes-
tic financial markets was also under way. Moreover, the scope of financial
services trade liberalization before the financial crisis was rather limited, as
noted earlier.
Two Hypotheses Regarding Indirect Benefits
Did the Korean economy then obtain some benefits of systemic im-
provement in the financial sector from the limited liberalization in the
1990s? Hypothetically, we think there could be the following two bene-
fits.
First, there might be gain from better monitoring. We noted that most fi-
nancial services trade took place between Korean banks and foreign banks.
With this, it should be noted that Korean depositors or creditors to the Ko-
rean banks did not perform much of a monitoring function on their banks,
since they felt safe under the implicit insurance provided by the govern-
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Fig. 9.4 Asset composition of the Korean branches of foreign banks
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Bank Management Statistics (various issues).
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ment. Given the situation, if foreign banks played a market disciplinary role
as large creditors, it could be regarded as a systemic improvement of the fi-
nancial sector.
Second, it is possible that the Korean branches of foreign banks may have
played a stabilizing role during the currency crisis. A low local commitment
is often pointed to as a risk that might accompany financial liberalization:
When crisis hits a country, foreign creditors tend to rush out of the country,
leaving domestic companies in a severe foreign currency credit crunch. This
would be more likely if creditor-borrower relationships are maintained at
arm’s length. By contrast, commercial presence of foreign banks might
ameliorate the problem because they might then be more committed to re-
lationship banking.
We examine these hypotheses in turn.
Was There Better Monitoring?11 If foreign banks supplied credit to Korean
banks with monitoring, it would have had a rather strong disciplinary eﬀect
on Korean banks. Throughout the 1990s more than half of the assets held
by Korean banks were in foreign currencies (figure 9.5), and Korean bank-
ing regulations prohibited banks from taking net open currency position.
Thus, a decrease in the supply of foreign credit would have implied a signif-
icant reduction in the opportunity set for asset management.
In order to see if foreign creditors performed any monitoring function,
we investigate whether their lending behavior could be explained in terms
of creditworthiness of individual Korean banks. If they did monitor Korean
banks, we may argue, it should be reflected in their credit policy toward the
Korean banks.
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11. This part of the paper draws on Dooley and Shin (2000).
Fig. 9.5 Composition of total assets of Korean banks, by currency
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Bank Management Statistics.
The trend in foreign currency liabilities of the six largest commercial
banks in Korea is shown in figure 9.6. As is evident in the figure, all of the
banks were increasing their foreign currency liabilities throughout the
1990s. Also evident, however, is an acceleration in the growth rates for the
three years from 1994 to 1996 and a sharp drop afterward in 1997. Our ex-
amination is focused on development for the 1994–96 period.
Although faster growth than in previous years is common to all six
banks, we note two banks, in particular: the Korea First Bank and Seoul
Bank. These two banks turned out to be the most troubled banks during
and after the crisis development. Capital of both banks was found to be
completely eroded, so the government was forced to intervene in December
1997 by injecting public money. However, despite the similarity in terms of
capital soundness, in foreign currency liabilities the two banks displayed
quite contrasting trends. The Korea First Bank recorded the highest growth
rate, whereas Seoul Bank recorded the lowest by a considerable margin. It
is questionable, however, if the inability of Seoul Bank to expand foreign
currency operation was due to foreign creditors’ monitoring. Rather, the
bank’s expansion was constrained by the supervisory authority. Although
there was much to be desired in Korean banking supervision, we are infor-
mally told that even under the less-than-satisfactory supervision practice,
the supervisory authority considered Seoul Bank to be in serious trouble
and felt it necessary to impose discretionary restrictions on its operation. In
other words, it appears that in the case of Seoul Bank a diﬀerent kind of
monitoring may have been in operation.
As a way of tentatively gauging whether the individual creditworthiness
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Fig. 9.6 Growth of foreign currency liabilities of the six largest Korean banks
Source: Cho Heung, KCB, Korea First, Seoul, Shinhan, Hanil Bank.
of Korean banks was one of the determinants for credit policies of foreign
banks, we now compute correlation of the growth rates of six banks with
their various performance and capital soundness variables. In particular,
keeping the above information in mind, we do the same calculations with
two sets of banks, one including all of the six banks and the other including
all but Seoul Bank.
Inspecting the result, shown in table 9.11, we note the following. First,
when Seoul Bank is included, the growth rate of foreign currency liabilities
is not significantly related with any variable considered. In addition, it has
negative, albeit insignificant, relationships with capital variables. Second,
when Seoul Bank is excluded, negative relationships of the growth rate with
all the variables are estimated. Moreover, the relationships with perfor-
mance variables are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, although
the degree of freedom was low at 4.
Therefore, albeit tentatively, overall evidences are against the hypothesis
that foreign banks were monitoring and concerned about the creditworthi-
ness of individual Korean banks.12
304 Sang In Hwang, Inseok Shin, and Jungho Yoo
Table 9.11 Relationships of Foreign Currency Liabilities of Korean Banks with Other Financial
Variables (%)
Growth Stock Price Capital Net Worth
Rate ROA ROE (won) Ratio Ratio
Cho Heung 2.78 0.41 5.98 9,701 3.23 6.52
KCB 4.43 0.30 4.80 7,841 3.54 6.23
Korea First 5.77 0.18 2.85 8,588 3.03 6.86
Seoul 1.19 –0.14 –2.09 6,937 4.23 6.84
Shin han 2.25 0.72 7.76 15,702 3.32 9.65
Han Il 5.98 0.33 4.80 9,067 3.36 7.33
Correlation 0.7479 0.2411 –0.224 –0.6298 –0.2592
Coefficient 0.13 0.522 –0.0001 –2.96 –0.41
(0.28) (3.48) (0.0003) (1.82) (0.77)
Correlation2 –0.8255 –0.8668 –0.7051 –0.1542 –0.4697
Coefficient2 –6.91** –0.81** –0.0003 –1.41 –0.58
(2.73) (0.27) (0.0002) (5.19) (0.63)
Source: Bank of Korea, Bank Management Statistics (various issues).
Notes: Growth rate = 1993–96 growth rates of foreign currency liabilities  1990–93 growth rates of for-
eign currency liabilities. Capital ratio = capital stock  total assets. Net worth ratio = shareholder’s eq-
uities  total assets. Coefficient is computed by regressing growth rates on each variable. Correlation2 and
coefficient2 are after excluding Seoul Bank. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
**Significance at the 5 percent level (d.f. = 4).
12. Surely it begs an answer why there seem to be negative relationships between foreign cur-
rency liabilities and their creditworthiness. Dooley and Shin (2000) argue that it reflects in-
centives for Korean banks to exploit the value of implicit insurance by the government. Also,
one may wonder how foreign creditors were pricing their loans to Korean banks. Unfortu-
Did Commercial Presence of Foreign Banks Mitigate the Credit Crunch? In
evaluating the hypothesis on a possible stabilizing role of Korean branches
of foreign banks, our answer relies on the following two observations.
First, as shown in figure 9.2, of the total assets held by banks, including
both domestic and foreign currency assets, the share of Korean branches of
foreign banks changed little after the crisis. If anything, their share de-
creased a bit in 1998. Hence, based on the changes in total assets, it is hard
to argue that Korean branches of foreign banks played a mitigating role in
the crisis. Second, narrowing the focus to foreign currency credit to the cor-
porate sector, the share of Korean banks declined and that of the Korean
branches of foreign banks increased slightly after the crisis (figure 9.7). This
tends to indicate that commercial presence of foreign banks mitigated the
crisis. However, their share was too small to be of any material impact. Be-
sides, “other foreign creditors” who provided credit at arm’s length also in-
creased their share. Thus, compared to these “other foreign creditors,” the
commercially present foreign banks do not appear to have played any
greater role. Therefore, overall it is hard to conclude either that the com-
mercial presence of foreign banks in Korea rendered soothing eﬀects dur-
ing the crisis or that it did not.
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nately, no oﬃcial data on borrowing rates of individual Korean banks exist. Nonetheless, we
are informed by Bank of Korea oﬃcials that there was not much discrepancy among Korean
banks in terms of international borrowing rates. Finally, as noted by one anonymous referee,
the exercise would remain incomplete unless determinants of bank-level foreign currency bal-
ances are identified. Therefore, the result of the exercise needs to be taken cautiously.
Fig. 9.7 Loans in foreign currency to corporate sector
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Bank Management Statistics, various issues; Bank of
Korea, Annual Foreign Exchange Statistics (various issues); Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omy, press release, 8 June 1999.
Discussions
Why Were the Gains from Financial Services Trades Not Evident? In theory,
international trade “without distortion” is supposed to increase the welfare
of the countries engaged. Thus, given the result that financial services trades
did not seem to be welfare improving for Korea before the crisis in 1997, nat-
urally we come to ask what kind of distortions existed. In our view, the an-
swer is obvious: the presence of insured agents and uneven liberalization
tilted toward those transactions with insured agents, namely, the banks.
Banks in Korea have been under implicit insurance, as in most other
economies. Thus, unless other preventive mechanisms are provided, counter-
parties of Korean banks in transactions are likely to have incentives to take
advantage of insurance. What we have shown is that foreign banks were not
exceptions. In addition, by regulation Korean banks were the only eﬀective
channels through which financial services trade took place. This, together
with the incentives given to foreign banks, implies that most of the financial
services trades for Korea were likely to be aﬀected by distortion of insurance.
In retrospect, therefore, one should not be surprised to find that financial
services trade brought about little gain to the Korean economy.
Are There Ways to Improve the Situation? The logical remedy to the prob-
lem would be to remove the insurance. As has been proven in other coun-
tries and by historical episodes, however, it is easier said than done. In fact,
some public insurance for banks would be practically unavoidable.
In the presence of certain insured transactions, policy responses to ex-
ploit gains from trades should be twofold: regulation and close supervision
of insured transactions and liberalization of uninsured transactions. In-
sured transactions need to be monitored by the insurance provider in order
to moderate moral hazard, which is the basic teaching of microeconomics.
In the case of financial services trades, it simply points to the necessity of
prudential regulation and supervision of banks. While keeping insured
transactions under close monitoring, one can make the most gains from
trades by allowing relatively free trade of uninsured transactions. It implies
that the commercial presence of foreign financial institutions should be
more liberalized to obtain gains from trades.
That said, we realize that improved supervision of banks and a more liber-
alized regime for commercial presence was exactly the policy strategy taken by
the Korean government after the 1997 crisis. Thus, as far as the Korean case
is concerned, we shall see in the near future if the policy change proves to be
suﬃcient to receive benefits from the liberalization of financial services trade.
9.5 Conclusion
Perhaps it is too early to make a comprehensive assessment of the impact
of the liberalization of financial services trade, because many of the liberal-
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ization measures currently in place have been taken only after the financial
crisis in 1997. Korea’s liberalization commitment was rather limited at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiation on financial service in De-
cember 1997 (Mattoo 1999). As was mentioned in section 9.3, in 1996 on its
accession to the OECD Korea made a substantial commitment to financial
reforms and liberalization that were going to be gradually implemented. Af-
ter the financial crisis, this commitment was bound in the context of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the reforms and liberalization were
quickly carried out. Therefore, the liberalization could not have had much
impact, since the variety of financial services to be traded had been rather
limited and agents allowed to trade had also been restricted before the cri-
sis, and not enough time has passed after the crisis.
As was discussed in the previous section, the liberalization of financial
services trade before the crisis led to a substantial capital inflow via the
cross-border mode of trade. Trade via the commercial presence mode also
took place, and this also mainly led to an increase in capital inflow, because
the main source of the funds of the foreign banks was interoﬃce borrowing
and their main clients were Korean banks. Hence, it was little diﬀerent from
the cross-border mode.
Freer capital flows have the eﬀect of smoothing consumption over time,
and this has to be recognized as the benefit of the liberalization. Of greater
interest to Korea, however, especially in the aftermath of the financial cri-
sis, would be the quality of five basic functions embodied in the services that
foreign banks provide. Section 9.4 considered whether foreign banks played
any disciplinary role through better monitoring, given that Korean banks
were under government-provided implicit insurance. There was little evi-
dence of such a role. On the contrary, the growth of their lending during the
1990s to domestic banks and a statistically significant, negative correlation
with indicators of the banks’ performance.
However, it would be too hasty to conclude that liberalization does not
provide the benefits discussed in section 9.2. Unlike trade in goods, from
which the benefits more or less automatically flow as the goods are delivered
across the border, the benefit from services trade is not automatic. The qual-
ity of financial services, especially that of the basic functions embodied in
the services, depends very much on the ROGs in the domestic financial sec-
tor, as discussed in section 9.3. Unless the ROGs become fair and transpar-
ent so that information gathering, credit assessment, risk management, and
so on may be the essential part of financial intermediation, it seems that lib-
eralization cannot deliver the indirect benefits. The finding in section 9.4
seems to be evidence of this point.
Section 9.4 also examined whether the commercial presence of foreign
banks mitigated (foreign currency) credit crunch during the crisis. Related
to this was the question of whether foreign banks tend to have low local
commitment and flee at the first sign of diﬃculty in the local economy. No
strong evidence was found either for the mitigating role or for low local
Korea’s Liberalization of Financial Services Trade 307
commitment. However, since the commercial presence of foreign banks in
the financial sector was rather limited, the discussion can only be tentative,
and no firm conclusion is warranted from Korean experience regarding the
eﬀect of the commercial presence.
After the financial crisis, the Korean government drastically widened the
scope and quickened the pace of liberalization and carried out reforms,
making eﬀorts to rehabilitate the financial sector, strengthening the pru-
dential regulation, and revamping the supervisory infrastructure. This rep-
resents a renouncement of its policy on the financial sector before the cri-
sis, the policy that gave rise to “implicit insurance,” as discussed in section
9.4. A crucial question for the success of financial reform is whether the re-
nouncement will be adhered to, because the government’s strong influence
on the financial sector was one of the major factors underlying the crisis. A
related development in the process of managing the crisis is that the influ-
ence of the government on the financial sector has become stronger after
the crisis. It remains to be seen if the government sticks to the renounce-
ment of its past policy, despite its strengthened influence.
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Comment Kazumasa Iwata
This paper is very useful in assessing the process of liberalization in trade in
financial services in Korea. Its analysis centers on cross-border trade and
the mode of trade via commercial presence. The financial liberalization was
triggered and promoted by Korea’s accession to the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996. To my surprise, it
has been accelerated by the financial and currency crisis of 1997.
The authors put emphasis on the importance of high performance of ba-
sic functions of financial intermediaries via commercial presence and the
improvement of Hayekian legal and regulatory infrastructure (or the “rules
of the game” of a given society), aside from the better quality and variety of
services provided by foreign institutions. However, they fail to confirm the
hypothesis on the expected improvement in regulatory infrastructure; the
financial crisis seems to have distorted and prevented the eﬀect of trade in
financial services from fully realizing in the economy. However, they testify
to the eﬀect of distorted liberalization based on Dooley’s hypothesis on in-
surance models of financial crisis (Chinn, Dooley, and Shresta 1999).
The paper noted that in the 1990s cross-border trade in financial services
was largely carried out between Korean banks and foreign banks. Notably, be-
fore the crisis the Korean banks were mainly borrowers. Partly due to the reg-
ulations on open currency position, the borrowing of overseas branches from
foreign banks was as large as the external debt of the Korean Banks. On the
other hand, the trade through commercial presence was not much diﬀerent
from cross-border trade, given the limited business scope for foreign banks.
It is indeed interesting to observe that foreign banks as lenders to Korean
banks are not concerned about creditworthiness and did not play the disci-
plinary role of monitoring the individual Korean banks (table 9.11). The in-
crease in borrowing from foreign banks tends to lower the rate of return on
assets of the Korean banks. The empirical evidence seems to support the hy-
pothesis on implicit insurance by the government and looting the value of
insured assets by foreign and Korean banks (Dooley’s insurance model on
financial crisis). The insurance model also assumes that the capital flight of
uninsured assets will emerge before the crisis and peak at the time of crisis.
This paper finds no strong evidence on capital flight through foreign finan-
cial intermediaries, as compared with domestic banks.
However, Chinn, Dooley, and Shresta (1999) argue that capital flight
started to increase after 1993–94 in Korean as well as other Asian countries.
The argument on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform revealed
that moral hazard on the side of lenders was enhanced by the IMF com-
mitment on the lender of last resort. Thus it seems premature to say that one
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should make the most gains from trades by allowing relatively free trade of
uninsured transactions by foreign banks with local commitment.
In this context I would like to ask whether capital flight has played an im-
portant role in destabilizing the economy. Figure 9.1 demonstrates that
portfolio investment continued to increase even in 1997, whereas bank bor-
rowing was reduced after 1997. Does this imply that foreign banks acted as
a main conduit of capital flight? We should be cautious, however, about the
extremely short-run tradings, notably the derivatives tradings that do not
appear in oﬃcial statistics.
Moreover, my basic question is why foreign banks failed to play a disci-
plinary role. I believe that financial liberalization in the absence of pruden-
tial control, both domestic and international, may result in destabilization
of the economy.
The authors argue that the liberalization gain has not been obtained due
to the uneven liberalization tilted toward insured agents (domestic banks).
However, I would like to ask whether undistorted liberalization can bring
about full benefit in the absence of appropriate prudential regulation of fi-
nancial intermediaries.
From the experience of currency crises, we know that excessive short-
term borrowing tends to make the financial structure fragile to shocks. The
paper examines the issue from the borrower’s (Korean) perspective. How-
ever, the risk-weighting scheme embodied in the Bank for International Set-
tlements (BIS) regulation on international banking favored short-term (less
than one year) lending to banks incorporated in the non-OECD member
countries (20 percent risk weight), while 100 percent risk weight is attached
to longer than one year maturity lending to banks. In contrast, the risk
weight is 20 percent in the case of lending to banks incorporated in the
OECD member countries. Thus it is not excluded that the combination of
uneven liberalization on the side of the borrowing country with the defi-
ciency of prudential controls on international banking on the side of the
lending country may be the source of the failure to realize the full gain aris-
ing from liberalization of trade in financial services.
Finally, the authors present the proposition that the implicit insurance by
government distorted liberalization process. Yet the proposition begs fur-
ther questions: Does it mean that the removal of implicit insurance can sta-
bilize the financial market? How about the role of explicit insurance? Is it
diﬀerent from implicit insurance? More generally speaking, what is the op-
timal risk-sharing scheme under conditions of uncertainty about contin-
gent liability arising from demand deposit contracts and information asym-
metry between lenders and borrowers? Is there a case for an eﬃcient
(partial) bankruptcy of banks or the optimal financial crisis, as argued by
Allen and Gale (1998)?
Information asymmetry between the regulatory authority and banks
points to the importance of self-discipline based on appropriate incentive
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structure among stakeholders to maintain the soundness of bank manage-
ment. At the same time, it is interesting to observe that the prudential regu-
lation moves toward the direction of strengthening self- and market-
discipline or the self-regulation in risk management; it attaches importance
to the establishment of risk management systems within individual banks as
well as self-imposed targets. The supervising authority simply checks and
approves at each stage of decision-making. The regulation under the infor-
mation asymmetry becomes more eﬃcient by strengthening self-discipline
rather than relying on the discretionary discipline imposed by the authority.
Although we admit that the current BIS regulation is deficient in many
respects, it works to make the domestic prudential regulation more eﬃ-
cient to the extent that the best practice embodied in the “core principles”
of the BIS promotes the self- and market discipline. Although it is com-
monly observed among diﬀerent countries that financial liberalization
lacking appropriate international rules and eﬃcient domestic regulation
has destabilized the economy, eﬃcient domestic regulation mediated
through the implementation of the best practice as common knowledge for
borrowing and lending countries may promote liberalization in service
trade. The role of the international rules combined with eﬃcient domestic
regulation provides useful lessons for the liberalization process in other
service sectors.
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